Unexpected corporate outcomes to hedge fund activism in Japan by Buchanan, J et al.
Article
Unexpected corporate outcomes from
hedge fund activism in Japan
John Buchanan, Dominic H. Chai and Simon Deakin
Centre for Business Research, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge,
Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK
Correspondence: dhc24@cam.ac.uk
Abstract
Hedge fund activism has been identified in the USA as a driver of enduring corporate
governance change and market perception. We investigate this claim in an empirical
study to see whether activism produced similar results in Japan in four representa-
tive areas: management effectiveness, managerial decisions, labour management
and market perception. Experience from the USA would predict positive changes at
Japanese target companies in these four areas. However, analysis of financial data
shows that no enduring changes were apparent in the first three areas, and that mar-
ket perception was consistently unfavourable. Our findings demonstrate that the
same pressures need not produce the same results in different markets. Moreover,
while the effects of the global financial crisis should not be ignored, we conclude
that the country-level differences in corporate governance identified in the varieties
of capitalism literature are robust, at least in the short term.
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1. Introduction
Hedge fund activism is essentially a search for investment returns through pressure on firms
to change their corporate governance. Beginning in the USA in the 1980s, it spread to
Europe and Asia in the following decades and is increasingly seen as a global phenomenon
(Becht et al., 2015). Seen by its critics as a form of ‘extortion’ (Lipton, 2013), hedge fund
activism has nevertheless found support from a series of empirical papers identifying positive
impacts of interventions on the performance of target companies (Brav et al., 2008, 2015;
Bebchuk et al., 2015; Becht et al., 2015).
In this article, we investigate whether activist hedge fund interventions in Japan produced
similarly positive, enduring outcomes to interventions in the USA in terms of financial
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indicators chosen to represent the four areas of management effectiveness, managerial deci-
sions, labour management and market perceptions. In order to achieve this, we employ data
on 117 Japanese companies targeted by 17 hedge funds considered to have a broadly defined
activist agenda at the end of 2007 and compare them to peer groups at three stages: immedi-
ately prior to 2007 (as a basic calibration), and then at one and three years after 2007 to
observe divergence. We then consider whether the outcomes we find reflect experience from
the USA over similar timescales.
Our research question is therefore whether the tactic of activism refined in one national
market produced similar results for corporate governance and market perception in another
national market with similar corporate structures and legislation. We answer this question
and then offer suggestions, drawing on the concept of ‘institutional distance’, on why the sit-
uation we have identified may have emerged.
We define the background to this study by describing the activist hedge funds and the
operating methods they developed in the USA, and by reviewing the conclusions of research-
ers there on the outcomes they produced. We consider the intellectual underpinning of hedge
fund activism in agency theory, observing its roots in the American market context and its
wide acceptance there as orthodoxy. Then we look at the Japanese market and summarize
its historical environment, noting its significance divergence from the USA, especially in its
focus on the concept of ‘corporate value’ rather than on shareholder value. To demonstrate
the results of this divergence, we observe the experience of two particularly aggressive acti-
vist hedge funds which entered the Japanese market from the early 2000s employing tactics
similar to those employed successfully in the USA and elsewhere, whose interventions com-
prise 30 of the total of 117 in our sample.
Against this background we present the findings of our quantitative research into the per-
formance of the full sample of 117 companies selected. We first explain our methodology for
company and peer group selection, and then present the results of our study. We discuss the
implications of these results, first in the context of Japan and then in the wider context of
corporate governance in general, and consider the possibility of convergence on US practice
that has been predicted by some commentators. Finally, we offer our conclusions, which
point to the continuing relevance of the cross-national divergences identified in the varieties
of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001), at least in the medium term.
1.1 Activist hedge funds and their US environment
We define activist hedge funds as those which research targets to identify latent value and
then acquire minority shareholdings as footholds to press boards to initiate changes in cor-
porate governance in order to release that value (please note also our working definition in
the ‘Methodology’ section below). Like hedge funds in general (Kellard et al., 2017) they
seek returns for their investors but, unlike other hedge funds, they focus explicitly on per-
ceived inefficiencies in their targets’ structures or strategies, such as inefficient use of assets
or failure to realize commercial opportunities, which generally have corporate governance
implications. As Bratton describes them: ‘They look for value but want it realized in the near
or intermediate term. Their strategy is to tell managers how to realize the value and to chal-
lenge publicly those who resist their advice’ (Bratton, 2007, p. 1383). The distinction
between activists and more patient value investors is sometimes vague because both seek
value through improved corporate efficiency and both may be categorized as ‘activists’
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whenever they engage with companies. A recent Preqin report estimated total assets under
management by ‘activists’ (which it defines as ‘hedge funds using shareholder activism as a
method of investment’) to be more than US$100,000 (Preqin, 2014). This amounts to less
than 0.4% of the OECD’s estimate of total institutional investment assets using data from a
majority of its member countries, mostly from 2009 (OECD, 2009). However, despite the
relatively small volume of assets controlled by such funds in a global context, they often
have a major impact: a comparative study of the effect on employment of investments by pri-
vate equity, a hedge fund and a sovereign wealth fund (though from a small sample) found
that the hedge fund intervention, with the lowest shareholding of the three, had the greatest
impact (Gospel et al., 2011). Moreover, the often public and confrontational nature of their
interventions has given them a disproportionately high profile; during 2007 Japan’s leading
financial newspaper, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, alone carried nearly 500 articles on investments
by activists or value funds in Japan (Buchanan et al., 2012, p. 173).
In the USA, the market where activist hedge funds made their first appearances during
the 1990s and where much of the research into their operations has been conducted, they are
often viewed as a force for good corporate governance. Some commentators have seen the
governance implications of their quest for returns as a vital means to promote shareholder
value, in contrast to the disappointing achievements of more traditional institutional share-
holders such as pension funds, and in this context they have been described as ‘the great,
shining beacon of hope’ for improved corporate governance (Macey, 2008, p. 272). Brav,
Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas, in their study of over 1,000 US activist interventions from 2001
to 2006, conclude that their ‘informed shareholder monitoring can reduce agency costs at
targeted firms’ (Brav et al., 2008, pp. 1772–1773).
These conclusions are not unanimously supported and other research suggests negative
aspects. Klein and Zur observe deterioration in the standing of targeted companies’ bonds,
while Li and Xu find that banks view their credit risk more harshly as resources are diverted
from companies’ businesses to their shareholders (Klein and Zur, 2011, pp. 1735–1736; Li
and Xu, 2009, p. 25). Nevertheless, recent analysis of the effects of hedge fund activism in
the USA has pointed to improvements in the way that companies perform, driven by changes
in the ways that they are managed, and also to reductions in labour’s share of the returns
with a corresponding increase going to investors in the form of dividends and share buy-
backs. All of these are considered to be fundamentally healthy outcomes which are wel-
comed by investors. For example, Brav, Jiang and Kim see hedge fund activists as a means to
mitigate the influence of ‘entrenched labour’ because they ‘prefer intense monitoring to gen-
erous wages, improving the productivity and profitability of target firms’. They consider that
targeted companies usually have poor productivity before intervention, which tends to be
‘reversed within the 2- to 3- year period post targeting’. Effectively the operating structure of
the targeted companies changes, with employees delivering greater productivity but losing
out to investors: ‘The improvement in labor productivity coupled with relatively stable
wages indicates that workers do not fully capture the value of productivity improvements,
but instead relinquish most of the surplus to equity investors after hedge fund intervention’
(Brav et al, 2015, p. 2726).
But perhaps the most positive impression regarding hedge fund activism in the USA is
that it creates enduring improvements in targeted companies’ performance and is favourably
received longer term by the market, implying consistently higher share prices. Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy and Thomas find that announcements of interventions generated a positive market
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response which persisted one year later. Looking particularly at confrontational activism,
they conclude that ‘the more favorable market response indicates that the perceived value
improvement comes from imposed changes, rather than a mere discovery of undervaluation
due to mispricing… .The positive market reaction to hedge fund intervention that we find is
consistent with the improved post-intervention target performance…’ (Brav et al., 2008, pp.
1764 and 1773). In contrast, Klein and Zur, using a sample of 151 interventions between
2003 and 2005, find an initial deterioration in target companies’ financial positions, which
corroborates the deterioration in bond and credit perceptions mentioned above, and no
improvement in the second year after intervention, although this finding is based on only
part of their full sample (Klein and Zur, 2009, p. 225). However, this view of only short-
term benefits has recently been contested by Bebchuk, Brav and Jiang. They examine 2,040
interventions between 1994 and 2007, using data on operating performance and stock
returns for the extended period 1991–2012, and conclude that during the third, fourth and
fifth years after intervention not only does operating performance generally show no decline,
but an improvement is evident in Tobin’s Q: ‘We find no evidence that such interventions…
involve “sacrificing the future for a quick buck”’(Bebchuk et al, 2015, pp. 1090 and 1141).
Underlying the interventions of activist hedge funds in the USA is the path-dependent his-
tory of the US market. By the early 1930s, as Berle and Means observed, growing dispersion
of shareholdings at large companies was releasing management from shareholder control
(Berle and Means, 1932). Subsequently, this new managerial autonomy was challenged as
institutional investors such as pension funds, mutual funds and insurers became important
shareholders. From a low base in the 1940s, they progressively increased their shareholdings
in the largest 1,000 US companies to reach 46.6% in 1987 and 76.4% by late 2007
(Conference Board, 2008), creating a network of more concentrated portfolio shareholders
willing and able to promote their interests. Scandals in the 1970s, such as the Penn Central
bankruptcy, drew attention to the dangers of unsupervised executive power and strength-
ened the case for supervising and controlling management more effectively (Cadbury, 2002,
pp. 7–8).
A theoretical framework emerged to complement and justify this process. ‘Agency theory’
explained the tendency for management to arrogate power and wealth from the true
‘owners’ of the company, its shareholders, and posited a need to find remedies. Jensen and
Meckling’s ‘Theory of the firm’ paper (1976) explained the firm as a nexus of contracts
rather than as a legal person with independent existence, where owners, in the form of share-
holders, sought to reduce agency costs by controlling their agents, in the form of managers,
who would otherwise be predisposed to act in their own self-interest at the expense of total
firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen expanded this argument to focus on the
need to supervise these agents, especially where the business generated free cash flow that
management might be tempted to squander: ‘Conflicts of interest between shareholders and
managers over payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates substan-
tial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather
than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies’
(Jensen, 1986, p. 323). By 1990s, these trends had produced a widespread view that compa-
nies existed primarily for the benefit of their shareholders and that the duty of management
was to promote ‘shareholder value’. By 2004, it could be stated that ‘In the field of finance,
the logic of shareholder value maximization is accepted as being so obvious that textbooks
just assert it, rather than argue for it. Deviation from this objective is cast as an agency











bridge user on 05 M
arch 2020
problem resulting from the separation of ownership and control, and failure to meet this
goal is assumed to be corrected by corporate boards, shareholder voice, shareholder exit,
and the market for corporate control’ (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004, p. 350). This idea began
to achieve recognition outside the USA, encouraging belief in a process of inevitable global
convergence: ‘There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value. This emergent consensus
has already profoundly affected corporate governance practices throughout the world’
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001, p. 439).
This was the background to the emergence of hedge fund activism in the USA in the
1990s, where the quest for shareholder value had become accepted by both investors and
corporate boards as the correct way to run a company, even though there might be differen-
ces of opinion over the details and timing of its implementation. The funds were able to tar-
get boards that appeared to have neglected this orthodoxy, secure in the knowledge that the
fundamental principle of shareholder value was difficult to challenge (Strine, 2016).
1.2 The spread of activism and the changing corporate governance
environment in Japan
From 2000, activist hedge funds, both Japanese and foreign, began to apply methods similar
to those developed in the USA to the Japanese market. Their demands covered a wide spec-
trum: Steel Partners tended to demand increased dividends from cash-rich targets, Dalton
concentrated on MBO proposals to release value, and TCI focused on large companies
whose complexity might benefit from simplification and thereby release cash or generate dis-
posal opportunities. Their underlying argument was that the post-War Japanese model of
companies, which was focused only on corporate value and therefore more inclined to accu-
mulate cash rather than distribute it, was unacceptable in an age of shareholder value. They
generally sought early release of cash to shareholders either by reducing reserves or by redi-
recting strategy from expensive longer-term objectives. In the Japanese context they were
‘insurrectionaries’ who actively mobilized against the institutional status quo (Mahoney and
Thelen, 2010, p. 23).
Their interventions in Japanese target companies have not been as extensive as their US
operations, nor have their experiences in Japan been as closely examined as in the USA. The
funds themselves began to operate in Japan because they saw opportunity there but, by the
end of 2008, it was evident that interventions using public and confrontational methods
were increasingly unproductive. The winding down of this hedge fund activism in Japan was
accelerated by the global financial crisis and the pressure it put on funds to maintain their
liquidity from 2008, but other factors, specific to the Japanese market and institutional con-
text, were also at work. This is illustrated by the experience of two funds which attracted
great attention in the Japanese press for their perceived willingness to confront target boards:
The Children’s Investment Fund (‘TCI’) of the UK and Steel Partners of the USA (operating
through their joint venture with Liberty Square). In October 2008, TCI withdrew from a
protracted and increasingly vituperative intervention in the electrical utility J-Power, appa-
rently at a loss (FT, 2008). In January 2009, despite previous success in extracting accumu-
lated cash from several small listed companies, it was reported that Steel Partners had sold in
full or reduced their holdings in 13 Japanese targets, amid speculation that they had overex-
posed themselves (Reuters, 2009). TCI continued its involvement in Japan thereafter with a
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much lower profile, and in December 2014 Steel Partners appeared largely to have with-
drawn from their only remaining major Japanese investment, in the wigmaker Aderans, an
intervention that began in 2004 and seems unlikely to have delivered a good return. There
were clearly factors present in the Japanese market that differentiated it from the USA.
At the root of these factors is a different conception of the purpose of the firm that
evolved in Japan following the Second World War. The corporate model that emerged was
forged by the demands of the labour force to be recognized as a stakeholder in the enterprise
to which it contributed its efforts, an acceptance by management that a degree of concession
was the only solution to the disruptive industrial action that characterized the late 1940s and
early 1950s at many large Japanese companies and, most importantly, a general understand-
ing that cooperation for the benefit of the business was the only way to prevent corporate
collapse and personal destitution in the hard years immediately after the war. As Gordon
describes it in his account of the Japanese steel industry: ‘The good of the company was the
good of all its members and of society at large. The interests of workers and managers, of
labor and capital, were in basic accord’ (Gordon, 1998, p. 201).
The resulting balance of forces created the ‘community firm’ in which, although hierarch-
ical distinctions certainly exist, the employees at all levels identify strongly with the company
as a continuing business to which they are personally committed. This model is indeed a
‘nexus of contracts’ but one where the company is perceived to be of value in itself, and it
has proved robust. In 2006, Mitarai Fujio and Niwa Uichiro, then chairmen of Canon and
Itochu respectively, published a book of commentaries on the purpose of the company enti-
tled Kaisha wa dare no tame ni (‘Who is the company for?’). Mitarai wrote: ‘When one talks
about things like a “spirit of love for one’s company” it may be dismissed by many people as
old-fashioned but it is something that I personally want to emphasize at this time particu-
larly. I want management, for a start, and every single employee to have this feeling of love
for the company’ (Mitarai and Niwa, 2006, p. 100). Underlying this attitude to the company
is a stable employment structure, at least for permanent employees at large Japanese compa-
nies, whereby school-leavers or university graduates may expect to join a company for the
entirety of their working lives and rise within that organization over time. Thus Japanese
senior managers have been described as the winners of a fierce competition for internal pro-
motion who run the business for the sake of the whole body of employees (Tachibanaki,
1998, p. 249), rather than to promote shareholder value through disbursement of profits.
The stable employment model is currently under pressure from the rise of atypical labour
(Sako, 2005, p. 591): according to official figures, approximately 20% of the male labour
force was employed on short-term contracts of various kinds at the beginning of 2013, com-
pared to less than 8% in 1984 (MIC, 2013). A gradual process is also evident in Japan
whereby the necessity for a greater allocation of wealth to the investment and pensions sector
is driving demand for a rise in corporate dividends: Thomson Reuters data show a mostly
steady rise in dividends as percentages of sales and assets for companies listed on the Tokyo
and Osaka markets from 2003, with a fall in 2009–2010 before growth resumed. The growing
influence of foreign institutional investors in Japan, which can be traced back to the 1990s and
has been steadily increasing since (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2001), is partly responsible for
this: overseas ownership is correlated with the unwinding of cross-shareholdings which served
to insulate managers in the past from stock market pressures, and with an increased incidence
of restructurings, which have further contributed to the erosion of the lifetime employment
model (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Ahmadjian, 2007). However, the focus on the firm as
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a community of shared interests remains intact: as Tiberghien observes in a study of Japanese
capitalism which develops the premise that change has been in progress for the past 30years,
‘the model that results from this process is less coherent than in 1980, partly modified, partly
resilient’ (Tiberghien, 2014, p. 52). Moreover, as Lechevalier emphasizes in the same study, ‘it
has been profoundly changed, though this certainly does not mean convergence towards
Anglo-Saxon or European forms of capitalism’ (Lechevalier, 2014, p. 2). Miyajima (2017, p.
7) suggests that the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on attitudes to corporate governance in
Japan was, if anything, to call into question the move to a more liberalized and financialized
economy that had characterized the preceding decade: ‘the emergence of the sub-prime crisis
from the summer of 2007 and the Lehman Shock of September the following year brought
about a decisive change whereby doubts suddenly intensified regarding the trend towards a
market economy along American lines that had continued unabated since 1997’.
Differences in adoption of corporate governance theory between the USA and Japan are
also important. As we have seen, agency theory ideas penetrated the financial and business
world in the USA to encourage an orthodoxy of shareholder value maximization. In Japan,
although admiration for the contemporary success of the US economy and the belief that
this success was driven by American corporate governance structures created enthusiasm for
introduction of these practices from the 1990s, this was more a search for practical solutions
to perceived problems in the aftermath of the equity and real estate Bubble than a reasoned
examination of theories. The ideas which emerged elsewhere to confront agency theory’s
implicit prioritization of shareholder value, such as ‘stakeholder theory’, ‘stewardship the-
ory’ and ‘team production theory’ (for example: Kay and Silberston, 1995; Davis et al,
1997; Blair and Stout, 1999) were already accepted tacitly in Japan as normal corporate gov-
ernance and management tended to reject shareholder value ideas as a threat to the cohesion
of their companies (Jackson, 2003).
2. Methodology
We have explained the background to hedge fund activism in Japan during the period 2000–
2008, noting firstly that two confrontational funds which attracted public attention did not
succeed in generating consistently high returns from their interventions, and secondly that
they faced a corporate governance environment which prioritized corporate value over
shareholder value. We now turn to our research question: whether the tactic of activism
refined in one national market (the USA) produced similar results for corporate governance
and market perception in another national market with similar corporate structures and
legislation (Japan). To do this, we carried out a quantitative survey of all the relevant
Japanese companies that we could identify as targets of hedge fund activism and for which
suitable data were available as at the end of 2007, the year that was with hindsight the high
point of hedge fund activism in Japan (Buchanan et al, 2012), and compared them to a sam-
ple of peer group companies in order to determine their comparative performance on our cri-
teria in the years following the interventions. Our working definition of ‘activism’ for this
purpose is any form of prescriptive engagement, which therefore encompasses a broad group
of investors between the two extremes of confrontational funds and more circumspect funds,
some of which might describe themselves as ‘value funds’.
Our chosen benchmark for comparison is the US market where activist hedge funds are
most numerous and where their activities have been studied in the greatest depth, providing
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us with an effective template to which we can compare our Japanese results. In the USA, the
broad consensus (although not accepted by all) is that activist hedge funds generate change,
and that the stock market tends to react favourably in the sense that share prices of target
companies rise from the stage of intervention, apparently with little sensitivity to the actual
remedies proposed by the funds or the period for which they continue to be shareholders. It
has further been argued, by Bebchuk et al. (2015), that beneficial changes persist several
years after the interventions into the medium term. In order to achieve a robust comparison
with these data, we have used a methodology similar to that used by Brav et al. (2008) and
Klein and Zur (2009) in their main US studies.
We began with Thomson Reuters’ database of investments by entities described as ‘hedge
funds’ with ‘active orientation’ as at December 2007. This is a very loose definition but it
provided an initial list of 145 interventions in individual non-financial companies listed in
Tokyo and Osaka. We removed from this list 80 companies where we were unsure that acti-
vism, even under our own broad working definition, had really taken place or where we felt
unable to conduct suitable analysis. These comprised asset management vehicles (since we
consider that they offered little scope for structural or strategic change), companies which
subsequently delisted (making financial comparisons difficult) and companies where the
fund in question had declared general policies through the press or its own website that sug-
gested that it did not practice activism.
By these means we arrived at a list of 65 companies from the Thomson Reuters database
of 145, all of which are still listed, and which we considered to have been likely activist tar-
gets in view of the funds involved. To these we added a further 52 companies, also still listed,
which did not feature in the Thomson Reuters data but which we had identified as targets
from our primary research and press searches, to give a total of 117 companies in which 17
funds were investing at the end of 2007. These funds are listed in Appendix 1. We believe
that some of these funds would contest the description ‘activist’ and, from our own research,
consider some to be more accurately ‘value’ investors which normally adopt a less confronta-
tional attitude to their targets; we justify their inclusion here because of the need to include
interventions where pressure was applied in private.
We then match each target company with a group of other companies which are compa-
rable to it with reference to industry, total book asset value and book-to-market ratio. There
are three stages in this process. First, we employ a matching algorithm to identify all compa-
nies with the same two-digit industry classification in Japan. Secondly, we select the 10 clos-
est companies in terms of total assets to each target. Then, from these 10 possible matches,
we choose the 5 companies with the closest book-to-market ratio to each target and calculate
the average for each group of 5 to create our matched samples.
We first calibrate our process by comparing the target companies to each appropriate
matched sample as at 2007 (generally using March 2006 data to represent the information
available immediately prior to 2007). This allows us to form a view on what the activists
were seeking in their targets. Then we compare the target companies to their respective
matched samples, firstly at one year after the interventions we have observed in 2007 (com-
paring 2008 to 2007 results) and then at 3 years from 2007 (comparing 2010 to 2007
results). We analyse the potential areas for change under our four categories of ‘management
effectiveness’, ‘management decisions’, ‘labour management’ and ‘market perception’. These
four categories are all examined under multiple criteria in order to increase the robustness of
our analysis, as follows: return on assets and return on equity to demonstrate management











bridge user on 05 M
arch 2020
effectiveness; ratio of dividend to total assets, leverage, ratio of cash to total assets and ratio
of capital expenditure to total assets to demonstrate changes in managerial decisions; ratio
of sales to employees to express labour productivity; ratio of wages to sales to express wage
intensity and the log of market capitalization and Tobin’s Q to demonstrate shifts in market
perception. Our variables are described in more detail in Appendix 2.
Although the boards of Japanese companies targeted in interventions by the two aggres-
sive funds described above publicly opposed the activists, it is still possible that they were
forced to change their governance practices under the public pressure to which they were
subjected by these funds. Moreover, the full sample of 117 companies that we use for our
quantitative analysis also includes companies subjected to more subtle pressure from funds
who kept their discussions private, who may have had greater success outside the public eye.
Whether the changes were driven by aggressive activism or more private persuasion, invest-
ors would surely benefit from a shift to greater emphasis on shareholder value and therefore
it seems likely that the market would view results produced by these interventions favour-
ably. Interestingly, in the German market, where similarities to Japan have been
observed for example, by Dore (2000) a recent study has noted both the expected ability
of blockholders to impede activism and the unexpectedly nuanced outcomes that sometimes
result (Fichtner, 2015).
We are constrained in our choice of methodology by our desire to use a similar method
to the US studies. Nevertheless, we have varied our approach slightly to increase robustness.
Klein and Zur (2009) use one-to-one matching but we have followed Brav et al (2008) in
our process of reduction from 10 to 5 comparative companies, differing only in two respects:
we use two digit rather than three digit SIC to locate our groups of 10, whereas Brav et
(2008) use three initially, dropping to two only where suitable matches are lacking, and we
use the average of each five company group rather than selecting a single comparator com-
pany from each group, which we consider a more robust approach. A potential weakness of
this methodology in general is that the targets may have such distinctive characteristics that
no sample offers a true comparison, despite meeting the financial criteria described.
However, we are dealing here with 117 targets, which should provide enough breadth to
compensate for variations in the results. Moreover, we know in the case of the 52 targets
provided through our own research that although they attracted activists for their cash
reserves, potential as MBO candidates or potential for strategic revival, none were unique in
the context of the Japanese market.
3. Results
The basic characteristics of companies targeted by activist hedge funds are shown in Table 1.
This sets out summary statistics on the target companies and reports the results of the uni-
variate analyses of the differences between the targets and the matched samples as of 2006/7.
Columns 1 to 6 report the summary statistics (mean, median and standard deviations)
between the targets and their respective sample groups. Column 7 shows the t -statistics,
which measure differences in means, while column 8 reports z-statistics for differences in
medians, using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. The Wilcoxon test is less influenced by extreme
observations and is included here as a robustness check, given that the skewness of the varia-
bles included in the analysis can be expected to affect the analysis of the means. In presenting
our results we assume that a difference between the target company and its peers is
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statistically significant if both the t -statistic and the Wilcoxon test indicate a two-tail signifi-
cance of at least 5 per cent.
Our results suggest that the targeting strategy of the activist hedge funds in Japan was
not identical to that found in the US studies, which were observing a more mature market
for activism, but does show important similarities. For example, Klein and Zur note that
‘Hedge fund activists target more profitable and financially healthy companies than other
entrepreneurial activists’ (Klein and Zur, 2009, p. 189). Here we note a superior return on
assets compared to the peer companies of the matched samples. However Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy and Thomas’ summary of target companies’ characteristics suggests some differen-
ces of approach: ‘Hedge fund activists tend to target companies that are typically “value”
firms, with low market value relative to book value, although they are profitable with sound
operating cash flows and return on assets. Payout at these companies before intervention is
lower than that of matched firms’ (Brav et al., 2008, p. 1730). While some of this descrip-
tion, notably regarding profitability and return on assets, appears to apply equally to these
Japanese targets, they seem to have paid higher than average dividends and to have been
well regarded by the market in 2006. A defining characteristic in Japan seems to have been
cash and the low leverage that this implies: these companies display significantly lower lever-
age than their peers. A similar phenomenon has been noted in the USA by Bratton: ‘Cash
Table 1. Characteristics of target companies
Target firms (N¼ 117) Matched firms Difference with matched firms
Mean Median SD Mean MedianSD t-Statistics Wilcoxon
Firm characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Management effectiveness
Return on assets 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.017 0.024 0.066 2.609  3.623 
Return on equity 0.047 0.057 0.135 0.025 0.050 0.173 1.286 1.856 þ
Managerial decisions
Dividend/assets 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 4.504  4.232 
Leverage 0.165 0.067 0.206 0.265 0.241 0.225 4.434  4.765 
Cash/assets 0.166 0.137 0.135 0.118 0.089 0.116 3.992  3.758 
Capital expenditures/assets 0.033 0.027 0.036 0.036 0.025 0.039 0.933 0.804
Labour management
Labour productivity 62.922 44.573 72.133 54.142 37.531 61.892 1.358 1.279
Wage intensity 0.176 0.138 0.124 0.181 0.158 0.142 0.405 0.403
Market perception
Ln(Market Cap) 10.307 10.129 1.288 9.894 9.702 1.325 3.084  3.160 
Tobin’s Q 1.269 1.123 0.461 1.191 1.085 0.422 1.786 þ 1.671 þ
Notes: This table reports the characteristics of target companies and comparisons with a set of matched compa-
nies. The first three columns report the mean, median and standard deviation of the characteristics for the target
companies. Columns 4 through 6 report the mean, median, and standard deviation of the characteristics for the
industry/size/book-to-market matched companies. Column 7 reports the t-statistics for the average differences,
and column 8 reports the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics, which are asymptotically normal, for the median dif-
ferences.
Significant at the 0.001 level; significant at the 0.01 level; significant at the 0.05 level; þsignificant at the
0.10 level.
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rich firms show up prominently in the sample’ but with a decline over the years of his study
period, implying that ‘activists grabbed low-hanging fruit in the first three years’ (Bratton,
2007, p. 1395), which suggests a parallel with the strategy of activist hedge funds in Japan
as they approached a new market and were drawn first to cash-rich targets. As a British acti-
vist hedge fund director explained to us during interviews carried out in the UK in 2009, it is
usually easier to justify demands to hand back accumulated cash to investors than to enter a
strategic discussion where subjective views inevitably come into play. With regard to labour
management, the targeted companies do not show signs of the initially poor productivity
that Brav et al (2015) identified at many American targets. Labour productivity appears to
be superior and wage intensity lower than at the matched samples, although not to a statisti-
cally significant degree.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize one-year and three-year changes in firm characteristics for
firms targeted by activist hedge funds. The first three columns report the mean, median and
standard deviation of the 3-year characteristics changes for the target companies. Column 4
reports the average difference of one-year or three-year changes between the sample firms
and the industry/size/book-to-market matched firms. Difference is taken between the target
company and the average of the matching firms and then averaged over all target companies.
Column 5 reports the t-statistics for these average differences.
Table 2. One-year changes in target firm performance
Summary statistics (tþ1)-(t) Difference with matched firms
Mean Median SD Diff w/Match t-statistic
Firm characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Changes in management effectiveness
DReturn on assets 0.011 0.005 0.033 0.005 1.480
DReturn on equity 0.022 0.010 0.115 0.002 0.061
Changes in managerial decisions
DDividend/assets 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 3.445 
DLeverage 0.006 0.000 0.046 0.008 2.080 
DCash/assets 0.005 0.000 0.043 0.004 1.543
DCapital expenditures/assets 0.001 0.001 0.026 0.000 0.404
Labour management
DLabour productivity 0.741 0.421 8.007 0.926 1.169
DWage intensity 0.005 0.002 0.019 0.001 0.869
Changes in market perception
DLn(Market Cap) 0.381 0.364 0.283 0.013 0.713
DTobin’s Q 0.203 0.182 0.178 0.038 3.014 
Notes: This table summarizes changes (D) in firm characteristics between the years 2007 and 2008 for firms tar-
geted by activist hedge funds. The first three columns report the mean, median and standard deviation of the
one-year characteristics changes for the target companies. Column 4 reports the average difference of 3-year
changes between the sample firms and the industry/size/book-to-market matched firms. Difference is taken
between the target company and the average of the matching firms and then averaged over all target companies
(‘Diff w/Match’). Column 5 reports the t-statistics for the average differences.
Significant at the 0.001 level; significant at the 0.01 level; significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 2 shows that there was no immediate effect on management effectiveness in 2008,
as we have defined it here. The most notable change was in management decisions on divi-
dend policy, where the ratio of dividends to total assets increased significantly, as might be
expected from companies under pressure to increase payments to shareholders. Leverage
rose slightly, which corroborates a picture of management raising gearing and increasing
payout. Labour management issues are in line with the situation at the matched samples,
with no significant divergence. However, the reaction of the market, as evidenced by move-
ment in Tobin’s Q, was not favourable. This seems contradictory to the prediction of invest-
ors welcoming the prospect of continued higher payouts and does not agree with the US
experience. It is also surprising, since investors might be expected to buy if companies had
been exposed to the arguments of pro-shareholder activists because they would have greater
expectations of increased dividends and a higher share price in the future.
Table 3 shows a detrimental change in management effectiveness in 2010: the targeted
companies, which in 2006 were strong performers, now slightly underperform the matched
samples. In terms of managerial decisions, our chosen indicators are not significantly differ-
ent from those of the matched samples, and the increase in dividend payments is no longer
significant. Labour management issues are again in line with the situation at the matched
samples, with no significant divergence. The interventions appear to have had no effect on
the targeted companies during the three year period with regard to the structure of their
Table 3. Three-year changes in target firm performance
Summary statistics (tþ 1)-(t) Difference with matched firms
Mean Median SD Diff w/Match t-statistic
Firm characteristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Changes in management effectiveness
DReturn on assets 0.021 0.012 0.048 0.011 2.599 
DReturn on equity 0.053 0.024 0.186 0.066 2.501 
Changes in managerial decisions
DDividend/assets 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.540
DLeverage 0.025 0.001 0.078 0.007 0.540
DCash/assets 0.022 0.021 0.071 0.007 1.161
DCapital expenditures/assets 0.012 0.004 0.034 0.000 0.139
Labour management
DLabour productivity 8.920 4.929 18.310 0.350 0.261
DWage intensity 0.027 0.012 0.050 0.001 0.339
Changes in market perception
DLn(Market Cap) 0.623 0.660 0.448 0.112 4.067 
DTobin’s Q 0.310 0.285 0.270 0.173 4.897 
Notes: This table summarizes changes (D) in firm characteristics between the years 2007 and 2010 for firms tar-
geted by activist hedge funds. The first three columns report the mean, median and standard deviation of the
three-year characteristics changes for the target companies. Column 4 reports the average difference of three-
year changes between the sample firms and the industry/size/book-to-market matched firms. Difference is taken
between the target company and the average of the matching firms and then averaged over all target companies
(‘Diff w/Match’). Column 5 reports the t-statistics for the average differences.
Significant at the 0.001 level; significant at the 0.01 level; significant at the 0.05 level.
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wages and productivity. The indications of market disfavour have increased, with both our
criteria for market perception now showing significantly negative results. It appears that the
hostile reaction of investors persisted and even intensified.
4. Discussion of the results
Our results are summarized in Table 4.
In none of the categories related to management policy or structure has there been lasting
change. Moreover, the reaction of the market has been hostile, even though investors as a
class might be expected to approve of an activist hedge fund intervention as a route to
increased shareholder returns, and indeed probably would do so in the USA. We now con-
sider why these results for Japan appear broadly to contradict those for the USA.
We are looking here at a transnational phenomenon, insofar as the practice of aggressive
shareholder activism by professionally managed funds was refined in one national market
and transferred to another. There are different and often contradictory ways to see this kind
of situation. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), as we have seen, foretold the convergence of
international corporate governance practices on the shareholder value principle developed in
the USA. In turn, this might imply that activism designed to exploit US corporate governance
practices should prove equally effective elsewhere. Non-resident portfolio investors in Japan,
often from the USA or the UK, held around 18% of the Tokyo and Osaka markets by 2000
(National Stock Exchanges, 2004), potentially creating allies for the activists; Ahmadjian,
while drawing attention to the many possible outcomes that exist, saw foreign investors as a
potential driver of change in Japanese corporate governance, perhaps in the direction of US
practices (Ahmadjian, 2007, p. 144–147). On the other hand, diversity still persists in corpo-
rate governance around the world and Aguilera and Jackson note the diversity of interre-
lated institutions that underpin this variety and the lack of homogeneity among such key
Table 4. Summary of results
Expectations from the US experience Similarity in Japan
Short term(1 year) Medium term(3 years)
1. Improved management effectiveness
(demonstrated by return on assets and return on
equity)
No No
2. Encouragement to management to revise its
financial strategy (demonstrated by ratio of
dividend to total assets, leverage, ratio of cash to
total assets, and ratio of capital expenditure to
total assets)
Yes No
3. Changes in labour management at targeted
companies (demonstrated by changes in labour
productivity and wage intensity)
No No
4. Improved market perception of targeted
companies (demonstrated by the log of market
capitalization and by Tobin’s Q)
No No











bridge user on 05 M
arch 2020
shareholders as pension funds and insurance companies when they are located in different
national contexts (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 447; 2010, pp. 530-2). The varieties of
capitalism viewpoint, with its emphasis on institutional similarities and differences (Hall and
Soskice, 2001), captures the challenge faced by activist funds in Japan: would their quest for
shareholder value find purchase in the institutional environment of Japan, which since the
1950 s has displayed many of the characteristics associated with what Hall and Soskice
(2001) call a ‘coordinated market economy’ or ‘CME’? ‘Important issues in the debate are
how tightly coupled national institutional configurations are and how much space they leave
for fundamental change, for example for convergence between previously different varieties
of a capitalist market economy’ (Streeck and Yamamura, 2003, p. 2). The varieties of capi-
talism approach has been criticized for underestimating diversity (Wood et al, 2014) and it
seems too sweeping to attribute the activist hedge funds’ disappointments exclusively to
Japan’s possible status as a particular kind of economy. Looking more specifically at our
four chosen categories, we offer explanations below from our earlier summaries of the
Japanese historical background and current environment and how they differ from those of
the USA.
We conclude, firstly, that these interventions harmed rather than improved management
effectiveness. In Japan, there has been no tradition of shareholder value as the main objective
of corporate activity since the 1930s and boards have become accustomed to a high degree
of autonomy. In principle, shareholder pressure may have positive effects where it remedies
genuine inefficiencies; our evidence suggests that in the Japanese context it confused and
diverted management whose main focus had hitherto been on the business itself. The impact
of activism in the Japanese context was further complicated by the decision of funds in the
earlier and more successful interventions to press for release of accumulated cash; simply
stripping cash from a business does not improve management efficiency.
Management’s conscious financial strategy, demonstrated by its decisions on leverage,
payout, investment and labour relations showed no change, with management policies in
these areas reverting to those of their peers by year three. The US experience suggests that
financial strategy is an area where activist hedge funds can add lasting value. However, in
Japan, increased leverage, higher payouts, and reduced investment are generally seen as per-
nicious because they undermine the future financial security of the business and reduce
‘corporate value’. We see no signs that hedge fund activists were drawn to these target com-
panies because their labour productivity or wage intensity was out of line with their peers,
and these interventions do not appear to have generated any change in the way that the
labour forces of the target companies were remunerated or in their productivity.
We now look at market perceptions of this situation, as demonstrated by share prices
and values of Tobin’s Q. In the USA, Brav et al. (2008) point to evidence of the positive mar-
ket perception that hedge fund activism generates and Bebchuk et al. (2015) find that this sit-
uation endures for at least three years after an intervention. However, we do not find that
pattern replicated in Japan. Despite the strong presence of foreign investors in the Japanese
market it is rare for them to hold a majority. This is true even among the larger, more inter-
national companies where they are more concentrated; their presence is less at the smaller
listed companies that we found typically to be targeted by activist hedge funds in 2007.
Major Japanese investors often have genuine portfolio interests but there is often a business-
linked interest too, which causes shareholders to value the ability of the business to trade
over its ability to render immediate returns, leading them to reject developments that
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threaten to undermine stability. Additionally, most Japanese investors tolerate great manage-
ment autonomy up to the point that managers prove themselves clearly inadequate. Activist
hedge fund interventions that destabilize the board’s control and perhaps raise doubts about
its competence (however much local investors may have rallied around to support it against
the activists earlier) may therefore encourage the market to perceive targeted companies less
favourably.
The global financial crisis from 2007 roughly coincided with the full period of our three-
year study. Brav et al. (2008)’s data finish well before this and even Bebchuk et al. (2015)’s
more recent study stops at 2007, so both predate the crisis (although the latter study uses
share data up to 2012). The period 2007-10 was a period when financial capitalism was
questioned widely and in Japan many saw the crisis both as vindication of more conservative
ways of running a business and as proof that hedge fund activism had sought to change com-
panies for the worse. As a director of one targeted company in Japan observed to us in early
2009, ‘Now we feel again that what we were saying all along was right’. In such a situation,
it is quite plausible that management should revert to more trusted ways. In the same way, it
seems plausible that investors should become wary of companies whose boards might have
been tainted by shareholder value ideas or whose cash reserves might have been depleted in
the ultimately unrealized cause of promoting shareholder primacy. Even in the USA, hedge
fund activism became less visible in 2008 and 2009 as the investors who underpinned the
funds withdrew their cash; a report from J.P. Morgan, describing the recovery of activism
there in 2010, claims that outflows from activists’ funds in 2008 and 2009 equalled the
inflows of the previous four years (J.P. Morgan, 2010). It could therefore be argued that
without the global financial crisis, activist hedge funds might have achieved continuing suc-
cess in Japan and brought about enduring changes in Japanese corporate governance. In ref-
utation of this, we cite the visceral reaction of the courts to Steel Partners’ attempts to
overturn Bull Dog Sauce’s dilutive counter-measures when they sought to acquire the com-
pany in mid-2007: ‘A joint-stock company is in theory a for-profit organization that maxi-
mizes its corporate value and pays it out as dividends to shareholders. But, at the same time,
a company cannot earn its profit without associating with employees, suppliers and consum-
ers. Thus, it can be said that a company is a social entity. Therefore, it must consider its rela-
tionships with stakeholders to enhance its corporate value. The idea that it is enough for a
company exclusively to consider shareholder value is too limited. If an abusive acquirer seek-
ing only self-interest controls the management of a company, corporate and shareholder
value will be harmed’ (Tokyo High Court, 2007). There were clearly bigger problems facing
aggressive activist hedge funds in Japan than just a temporary shortage of investment cash:
the principle of managing a company primarily for the benefit of shareholders was simply
not acceptable to public opinion.
A series of developments in Japanese corporate governance regulation since 2014 has
seen the introduction of a Stewardship Code and a Corporate Governance Code, together
with other reports and continuing committees. The declared objective is to foster economic
recovery, but the mechanisms employed the Stewardship Code which seeks to co-opt
investors into the corporate governance debate and the Corporate Governance Code which
seeks to promote the OECD’s view of governance priorities such as transparency and
overview echo many innovations publically promoted by the activist hedge funds until
2007. This is very much an official attempt to convince managers that their existing practi-
ces, in some respects, are no longer ‘best practice’ (Lane and Wood, 2009, p. 536). It is
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tempting to see these developments as a vindication of the activists’ position but the essential
element of returning cash to shareholders as a priority is absent. According to an IMF paper
from 2014, ‘Japan’s excessive corporate savings’ are still holding back growth (Aoyagi and
Ganelli, 2014).
The future trajectory of Japanese corporate governance is therefore still unclear but it is
worth considering developments in two other national markets, often compared to Japan as
fellow CMEs: Korea and Germany. Korea is especially interesting because it shares a legal
system whose historical origins and current form are very close to that of Japan. It deviates
from Japan in its preponderance of founding families who control large groups through net-
works of affiliates but its focus on corporate value is, if anything, even more extreme. The
conclusion of a study on attempts to reform corporate governance at Samsung Electronics
(‘SEC’), possibly Korea’s most influential and successful company, was that ‘despite its
attempts, the overall state of mind of companies such as SEC is to consider requests for
improved corporate governance and the demands of minority shareholders as quarrelsome
interference’ (Jang and Kim, 2002, pp. 95, 98, 103). The experience of the activist Elliott
Management in 2015, when it failed to block a reorganization within the SEC group that, in
its opinion, disadvantaged minority shareholders, only served to reinforce this view (see, for
example, FINalternatives, 2015). The Korean situation is complicated by the influence of
founding families and their outward indifference to conflicts of interest.
In Germany, where a growing incidence of hedge fund activism can also be observed,
Haberly notes the replacement of traditional patient capital from financial institutions with
inflows from sovereign wealth funds at several major German companies after the global
financial crisis. In his view, the essential identity of the German model as a CME-type econ-
omy has been retained, and has in some ways even been underpinned by this new form of
support (Haberly, 2014). Fitchner (2015), similarly, points to the complexity of hedge fund
interventions in Germany. As in Japan, there has been a decline in blockholdings of the kind
which protected managers in the past from external financial pressures, and an increase in
the number of activist hedge fund interventions, although numbers remain very small when
compared to the picture in the USA. Fitchner’s case studies show that in firms where block-
holdings remain, incumbent managers are generally able to fend off hedge fund influence.
However, the emerging pattern is not one of simple resistance to activism: in some cases,
listed companies have used activist interventions to boost their share price prior to a sale of
holdings. At the same time, some activist funds have been prepared to make long-term com-
mitments to the companies they invest in, in effect adapting their strategies to the German
context of ‘patient capital’.
Both the apparently unresponsive Korean and the apparently more flexible German atti-
tudes to activism can be interpreted as signs that prioritization by management of corporate
value at the expense of general shareholder value, once established, does not change easily.
Japan’s current attempts to promote change may have relevance to both these markets in the
future.
5. Conclusion
It has recently been argued that ‘shareholder activism has gone global’ (Becht et al., 2015,
p. 1), but a close study of the experience of hedge fund activism in one the world’s largest
and most enduringly successful market economies, Japan, suggests otherwise. Hedge fund
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activism appears to have produced outcomes in Japan that were very different from the out-
comes reportedly achieved in the USA. During the 3 years after hedge fund interventions, the
boards of the targeted companies in our sample did not generally become more efficient at
delivering profits and neither, after some initial variation in year one, did their financial
strategy ultimately deviate from that of their peer groups. Nor did the balance of their labour
management, as reflected in productivity and wages, change at all. Perhaps most surpris-
ingly, given the activists’ public stance as promoters of shareholder interests, investors in the
stock markets did not rate the companies that had been targeted any more highly, as the US
experience had suggested they might, and indeed appeared to consider them less valuable
than peer companies where no intervention had occurred.
The Japanese situation is clearly different from that of the USA. The shareholder primacy
model of corporate governance that underlies so much of hedge fund activism depends on
local institutions in order to function consistently and to achieve more lasting results than
simply one-off payments. There were other factors at work in Japan, such as the broad toler-
ation of managerial autonomy, but the lack of general acceptance of the shareholder primacy
model, as demonstrated by the Bull-Dog Sauce judgment, was the main impediment to the
funds’ success and demonstrates the need to view Japanese corporate governance as a set of
practices embedded in the Japanese business system (Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2008, p. 6).
Just as international business studies observe the concept of ‘institutional distance’ as an
impediment to seamless implementation of home country concepts by multinational enter-
prises (Jackson and Deeg, 2008, p. 543), so there appears to be a similar institutional dis-
tance in the practice of corporate governance which accounts for its continuing global
diversity. Research from Korea and Germany implies that a corporate value focus does not
change easily.
The global financial crisis undoubtedly worked against the interests of the activist hedge
funds in Japan from 2008 by reducing their funding and discrediting the idea that companies
should operate with minimal reserves while maximizing distributions. However, the strength
of opposition to the funds’ attempts to strip out more cash before the crisis suggests that
antipathy to shareholder value ideas was much more fundamental in Japan than something
simply occasioned by the crisis. Whereas American researchers in 2015 could still claim that
interventions generated lasting improvements in targeted companies in the USA, our research
shows no such signs in Japan.
Extrapolating from our quantitative results, we suggest the following explanation of this
situation. If corporate governance is a local phenomenon, embedded in its historical context,
as seems to be the case in Japan, then only convergence of historical experience is likely to gen-
erate similarity of corporate governance practice. Changes in Japan since 2014 may point the
way to an acceptance of different interpretations of corporate purpose. It is too early to tell if
Japan will ever embrace shareholder value fully, although change can come suddenly after a
long delay, as Mahoney and Thelen observe (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 31).
Nevertheless, corporate governance arises from its environment and particular forms of it can-
not easily be imposed at short notice from above, mainly because key receptors for the behav-
iour they require are unlikely to be present in a different environment. As Culpepper observes
in the particular context of corporate acquisitions: ‘Some regimes of corporate control treat
companies as mere commodities, free to be bought and sold at will by owners in search of the
highest rate of return on their investment. Others, in contrast, view the company as a place
where many important political and distributive compromises of capitalist democracy are
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struck… .These differences are fundamental to the distinction between different varieties of
capitalism’ (Culpepper, 2011, p. 177). This situation does not preclude change but it means
that change is most likely to be driven not by a dispassionate assessment of the attractions of
any particular model of corporate governance but by the accumulated weight of institutional
changes in any given national environment (Filatotchev et al, 2013). The impediment faced by
the activist hedge funds observed in this study was that they were attempting to subvert institu-
tionalized patterns of behaviour in the short term, relying on their preferred logical arguments
and ignoring the fact that these ran counter to the weight of common practice. Without a gen-
eral acceptance that shareholder value was the prime corporate objective, their attempts to
extract value were seen simply as extortion.
Our findings have implications for the wider literature on the impact of different types of
ownership (passive and active, foreign and domestic) on corporate governance structures
and outcomes. Ahmadjian’s research on the impact of foreign institutional ownership on
Japanese companies (Ahmadjian, 2007) suggests that it often goes hand in hand with
increases in downsizing and restructuring, factors which have tended, in turn, to undermine
the institution of lifetime employment. Similarly, Guery et al. (2017) find that the involve-
ment of foreign investors in private equity-led buyouts in France makes it more likely that
redundancies and a reduction in employment will result. Our results, however, suggest that
in the Japanese context, hedge fund interventions, which have been overwhelmingly foreign
in origin, have not led to significant changes in domestic firms’ strategies to the management
of labour. It would seem that Japanese firms have been particularly resistant to the confron-
tational style of corporate governance which the activist funds pursued. A potentially fruitful
avenue for work would to compare and contrast outcomes from hedge fund activism with
those from other so-called ‘alternative investments’, including sovereign wealth funds and
private equity (Applebaum and Batt, 2014; Goergen et al., 2014), in Japan and elsewhere.
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List of 17 funds associated with target companies in sample
Investor Name Country Targets
Blue Sky Capital Management Pty. Ltd. Australia 3
Dalton Investments, LLC USA 6
Elmwood Advisors Pte. Ltd. Singapore 1
Gandhara Advisors Asia Limited Hong Kong 2
Halberdier Capital Management Singapore 2
HBK Investments, LP USA 1
Ichigo Asset Management, Ltd. Japan 7
Indus Capital Partners, LLC USA 3
Liberty Square Asset Management, LLC USA 11
Och-Ziff Capital Management, LLC USA 2
Perry Capital USA 1
Silchester International Investors UK 1
Steel Partners, LLC (JV with Liberty Square) USA 29
Symphony Financial Partners Co., Ltd. Japan 19
The Children’s Investment Fund Management LLP UK 1
Tower Investment Management Co., Ltd. Japan 29
Wesley Capital Management, LLC USA 1
Total (including two targets where two funds were present): 119




Return on assets Ratio of total net income to total assets
Return on equity Ratio of total net income to shareholder’s equity
Managerial decisions
Dividend/assets Ratio of total dividend payments to total assets
Leverage Book leverage ratio defined as debt/(debt þ book value of equity
Cash/assets Ratio of total cash to total assets
Capital Expenditures/assets Ratio of total capital expenditure spending to total assets
Labour management
Labour productivity Ratio of total sales to employee numbers (in million yen)
Wage intensity Ratio of expenditure on wages to total sales
Average age of workforce Average age of employees
Market perception
Ln(Market Cap) Natural logarithm of market capitalization in billions of yen
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q defined as (equity market value þ book value of total
liabilities excluding shareholders’ equity)/(equity book value þ
book value of total liabilities excluding shareholders’ equity).
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